逆选择、道德风险与农业保险经营主体创新

Adverse Selection,Moral Hazard and Innovation on Agricultural Insurance Administrative Organization

农业保险市场上因信息不对称导致的逆向选择和道德风险普遍存在。相互制保险可产生一种信息充分共享的机制,拓展信息来原渠道,提高信息传递效率,丰富组织内控信息,从而优化信息的分配。而银行类金融机构与相互制农业保险组织合作,有利于充分利用双方的信息,提高农业保险信息利用率,在更大程度上控制逆向选择和道德风险。因此,以相互制保险为基础的"银保合作"是信息不对称条件下农业保险经营主体创新的理想选择,是农业保险逆选择和道德风险控制的有效保证。

Owing to the existence of information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard are pervasive in the agricultural insurance market. Mutual system insurance can produce a sufficient information sharing system, enlarge the channels of information sources, enhance information transmitting efficiency and enrich organizational interior information, thus, it is propitious to information distribution. The cooperation between financial organizations such as banks and agricultural insurance organization on mutual system is beneficial for sufficiently utilizing information on both sides, promoting efficiency of agricultural insurance information utilization, which could further control adverse selection and moral hazard. Therefore, joint bank assurance based on mutual system insurance is an ideal choice for agricultural insurance administrative organization innovation on the condition of information asymmetry. Meanwhile, it performs as a solid guarantee for controlling adverse selection and moral hazard of agricultural insurance.