股权控制链、代理冲突与审计师选择

Control Chain,Agency Conflicts and Auditor Choice

本文利用2002—2003年我国A股市场数据,从上市公司至其最终控制人之间的股权控制链①的视角,考察了上市公司控制性股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突,并在此基础上研究了其与高质量外部审计需求之间的关系。结果表明,控制链越长,控制性股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突就越严重。研究发现,控制性股东的控制权结构所产生的代理冲突越严重,上市公司越有可能聘请审计质量较高的"四大"审计;而聘请"四大",能够降低控制性股东的资金侵占程度,减缓公司的代理冲突。这说明在我国现阶段,高质量外部审计具有一定的治理作用。

Based on a dataset of control chain and other data in China's listed companies during 2002-2003,this paper analyzes the relationship among control chain,agency conflicts and auditor choice viewed from the control chain between the listed companies and theirs ultimate controlling shareholders.We find that the longer the control chain between the listed companies and theirs ultimate controlling shareholders is,the more funds of the listed companies are appropriated by theirs controlling shareholders.It may also be said that the longer the control chain is,the more severe agency conflicts between the controlling shareholder of a listed company and its non-controlling shareholder is.We also find that the more severe agency conflicts is,the more likely the corporate would hire 'big four' auditors well known for quality auditing reports.And by two-stage procedure,we also find that the choice of 'big four' helps reduce funds appropriation by controlling shareholders.