银行监管中的最优市场约束研究

Study of Optimum Market Discipline in Bank Regulation

基于社会利润最大化的视角,本文研究了银行监管中的最优市场约束问题。研究发现:在银行监管中实施最优的市场约束不仅可以提高银行监管帕累托效率,而且可以给社会带来最大的利润;最优市场约束水平受到银行"额外价值"、无市场约束时贷款失败的概率、贷款成功的收益、市场约束的成本弹性等因素的影响,且与这些因素呈正相关;最优市场约束水平对银行"额外价值"、贷款成功的收益这两个因素的变化敏感性较强,对无市场约束时贷款失败的概率的变化敏感性较弱,对市场约束的成本弹性的敏感性呈现出由强变弱的趋势。

This paper researches on the optimal market discipline from the perspective of the social welfare maximization.We find out that the optimal market discipline can achieve the Pareto Optimality in bank regulation and the social welfare maximization;when the maximization of the social welfare occurs,the optimal level of market discipline depends on the 'additional value of bank',the probability of bad loan without market discipline,the earnings of successful loans,and the cost elasticity of market supervision,which is positively correlated with such factors.And the optimal level of market discipline is strongly sensitive to the 'additional value of bank' and the earnings of successful loans,but weakly sensitive to the probability of bad loan without market discipline,and gradually weakened to the cost elasticity of market supervision.