摘要
以中国上市公司为样本,采用2002-2005年的数据,从CEO更替的视角检验了中国公司治理的有效性。实证结果表明:中国的公司治理是有效的,即企业绩效差的CEO更可能被更换,但是这种有效性与正式制度安排的公司治理机制并不相关,这可能是非正式制度的公司治理机制发挥了重要作用。
Taking Chinese listed corporations as the sample, this study uses the data during 2002 to 2005 to examine the effectiveness of China's corporate governance. The empirical results show that poor performing CEOs are more likely to leave or be dismissed, which suggests that China's corporate governance is effective. However, the results suggest that the effectiveness is not related to gover- nance mechanisms that belong to formal institutions and maybe the informal ones play an important role in it.
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
2009年第7期918-923,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(70532001)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872048)
教育部新世纪人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-08-0302)
教育部人文社科重点研究基地资助重大项目(04JJD630004)
2007年度天津市哲学社会科学规划项目资助重点课题(TJGL07-83)
南开大学"985工程"中国企业管理与制度创新基地资助项目(1050821210)
关键词
公司治理
CEO更替
有效性
委托代理理论
corporate governance
CEO turnover
effectiveness
principal-agent theory