基于中国上市公司的政府干预、金融市场化与法人股价值研究

Government Intervention,Financial Liberation and Block Share Value:Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

以上市公司2000-2004年法人股协议转让的经验数据为样本，实证分析了政府干预和金融市场化程度对法人股价值的影响。研究发现，政府干预会降低法人股协议转让价格，但这种影响主要体现在国有企业上，对民营企业的影响并不显著。这为政府掠夺之手的理论提供了新的证据，同时也能更深入地了解政府干预对不同所有制企业的影响。此外，还发现发达的外部金融市场可以提高法人股转让价格，这表明金融中介体系作为产权保护的替代机制，能够通过约束经理人行为以及提高企业效率为企业带来治理溢价。

With the sample of negotiated block trades from 2000 to 2004, we analyze the impacts of governance intervention and regional financial liberation on block share value. We find out that policy burden will decrease the price of block shares. However, this negative effect is not significant for private firms. The result provides evidences for the theory of grabbing hand and makes us understand more deeply the impact of governance intervention on the firms of different ownership types. We also find out developed financial market would heighten the transferring price of the block shares. This result shows that developed financial system as a mechanism to protect property can improve corporate efficiency through constraining the manager behaviors.