董事会独立性的交互效应和中国资本市场独立董事制度政策效果的评估

The Interactive Effects of the Independence of the Board of Directors,and an Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Policies for the System of Independent Directors in China's Capital Markets

本文利用中国上市公司的数据实证考察了董事会独立性与其他公司治理机制的交互效应对改善企业绩效(公司治理)的作用,在此基础上对中国资本市场推出的独立董事制度的政策效果进行评估。研究结果显示,董事会独立性与大股东监督、管理层薪酬激励等治理机制的治理效果互相加强(互补),而与法律对投资者权力的保护和股权制衡等治理机制则存在替代关系。因而,中国资本市场独立董事制度的推行将改善大股东监督和管理层薪酬激励的治理效果,但在一定程度上将削弱法律环境改善与股权制衡的治理效果。董事会独立性加强对董事会的领导结构的治理效果则并无显著影响。不同于以往的研究结论,本文的研究表明,对于中国资本市场而言,董事会独立性的公司治理效应不是以直接,而是通过与其他治理机制的交互影响而间接发挥公司治理作用的。因而,本研究对于合理评估中国资本市场推出的独立董事制度的政策效果和未来的改进和完善具有重要的政策涵义。

By the use of the data on China's listed companies,we have surveyed the interactive impact between the nature of the independence of the board of directors (TNOTIOTBOD) and other corporate governance mechanism on the impact on the improvement of enterprise's achievements in the aspect of corporate governance,on which basis we have evaluated the results of the policy for the system of independent directors,a system introduced in China's capital markets.The results of our study show that TNOTIOTBOD is complementary to the effect of the supervision over main share-holders and of the monetary incentives given to manages and other governance mechanisms,while TNOTIOTBOD can substitute for the legal protection of the right of investors,the check and balance of stock equity and other control mechanisms,and vice versa.Therefore,the system of TNOTIOTBOD in China's capital markets will increase the effect of the governance by means of the supervision over main shareholders and monetary incentives given to managers,but this system will,to some extent,decrease the effect of the improvement of the legal environment and that of the governance of the check and balance of stock ownership.To strengthen TNOTIOTBOD has no significant bearing on the impact of the control of the leadership structure of the board of directors.Our conclusion,which is different from the past relative conclusions,is that,in terms of Chan's capital markets,the results of control over companies with TNOTIOTBOD do not impact on the control of companies directly,but indirectly by means of the interaction between TNOTIOTBOD and other governance mechanisms.Therefore,the results of our research have important policy implications both for the rational evaluation of the effects of the policy for the system of TNOTIOTBOD carried out in China's capital markets,and for the improvement and perfection of this system.