计及爬坡率申报的电力市场博弈分析

Game analysis of electricity markets considering bidding of ramp-rate

为了充分发挥具有快速爬坡能力的机组的性能,介绍了一种考虑机组爬坡策略的电力市场博弈模型.基于市场统一出清、负荷需求无弹性及发电商按边际成本报价等前提,讨论了发电商爬坡成本及降低爬坡申报值的可能性与限制措施;分析了在非线性边际成本时的发电商提高爬坡申报值的博弈行为,利用置换法结合图形分析得出其Nash均衡解析解.算例表明,发电商合理申报爬坡率能够有效降低市场出清价格和系统购电费用,减少高成本机组的运行与不必要的开停机,促进市场稳定.

A game model considering the ramping strategy of the units in electricity markets was presented to give full play to the units＇ rapid ramping capabilities. Based on the uniform-price auction, inelastic demand and marginal cost pricing, the ramping cost and the probability and restrictions of the decreasing of ramp-rate bidding were discussed. The analytic solutions of the Nash equilibrium of the increasing of ramprate bidding was obtained by replacement method combining graphic analysis under the condition that the marginal cost was nonlinear. The results of examples showed that reasonable ramp rate bidding of the generators can reduce the clearing price and purchase cost of the market, the operation of the high cost unit, and the unnecessary unit up-down effectively, and enhance the stability of the market.