上市公司高管薪酬与盈余管理实证分析

Top Executive Compensation and Earning Management in China’s Listed Companies

采用操纵性应计作为盈余管理的代理变量,对中国上市公司高管年薪与盈余管理之间的关系进行了实证分析。研究发现:操纵性应计对上市公司高管年薪存在显著影响,但影响程度小于经营活动现金流与非操纵性应计;非经常性损益对高管年薪的影响并不显著;高管操纵盈余的动机随着年薪与报告利润相关性的增加而增加。

Empirical study on the relation between earning management and top executive compensation in China＇s listed companies, using discretionary accruals as proxy variable of earning management, show that the discretionary accruals increases top executive compensa- tion although the coefficient of discretionary accruals is lower than that of no discretionary accruals and operating cash flow, and extraordinary items doesn＇ t increases top executive compensation, and the use of income-increasing discretionary aecruals increases with the correlation between compensatinn and reported income.