摘要
对农村民间金融不完备借贷契约下的高履约率现象进行了分析。认为农村民间金融保持高履约率的"秘密"在于其高效的私人治理机制,这些机制主要包括信息与信任机制、重复博弈与声誉机制、灵活的抵押担保机制和多样的惩罚机制等。得出的结论是:农村民间金融具有自动履约的内在机制,当前应赋予农村民间金融合法的生存地位,并通过相关法律的完善促进其规范发展。
This paper studied the phenomenon of high-performance rates under incomplete contract of informal finance in rural area. It considers the ＂secret＂ lies in its high efficiency of private fulfillment mechanisms. These mechanisms include information and trust mechanism, repeating game and reputation mechanism, flexible collateral mechanism and variety of punitive mechanism etc. The conclusion is that the informal fmance in rural area has its automatic fulfillment inherent mechanism, it should be given legal status to survive, and through related laws to promote its norm development.
出处
《经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第7期74-77,共4页
On Economic Problems
基金
国家社科基金资助课题“完善农村金融体系和强化农村金融服务研究”的阶段性研究成果(07BJY169)
关键词
农村民间金融
契约治理
信任机制
声誉机制
informal finance in rural area
contract fulfillment
trust mechanism
reputation mechanism
