机制设计与国际卫生合作中的困境

Regime Design and Dilemma in International Health Cooperation

本文运用情景结构主义分析工具对传染性疾病国际通报合作长期止步不前这一问题进行了研究。尽管《国际卫生条例》将传染性疾病的国际通报合作塑造成具有良好合作前景的"猎鹿游戏",但由于国际合作的专业性与主权国家利益的复合性之间存在矛盾,国家往往将贸易利益的考虑置于健康的价值之上,从而使得合作陷入相互背叛的僵局。通过改善机制的设计,这一困境可以得到缓解。

Although international cooperation on notification of communicable diseases has a long history and a set of regimes has been established,the established rules and regulations have been poorly obeyed. The author tries to explore this problem with the tool of situation-structuralism,arguing that International Health Regulations,which should have been the most important regime in this area,is defective in its design. Even though it has made cooperation a promising field with high payment for all sides,it tends to fall into stalemate of mutual rebellion between the participating nation states,due to the conflicts between the specialized nature of international cooperation and the complexity of national interests. The dilemma in the process of international cooperation could be alleviated by perfecting the design of the corresponding international regime.