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企业销售人员的薪酬激励研究——基于多任务委托-代理框架的分析 被引量:2

Research On the Compensation Incentive of Salespersons——An Analysis Based on a Multitask Principal-Agent Framework
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摘要 销售人员的工作有三个基本的任务维度:扩大销售额、提升顾客满意度和收集市场信息。在假设扩大销售额的绩效可以完全度量、其他两项任务度量程度不定情况下,建立了一个三任务的委托-代理模型,通过分析销售人员在三项任务的努力成本相互独立、互补和替代的情况下,得出了三个重要的命题。这些命题所引申的结论对于指导企业销售人员的薪酬管理具有重要的参考价值。 The research divides the salesperson's work into three basic tasks: enlarging the sales, satisfying consumers and collecting market information. Assuming that the task of enlarging sales .can be completely measured and the measurability of the other two tasks are uncertain, we build a three - task principal - agent model and through the analysis based on whether the costs of efforts are independent or complimentary or substitute, we get three very important propositions which will be useful guild for enterprise's compensation policy.
出处 《湘潭大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第4期82-87,共6页 Journal of Xiangtan University:Philosophy And Social Sciences
关键词 多任务委托-代理模型 销售人员 薪酬激励 multitask principal - agent model salesperson compensation incentive
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参考文献12

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同被引文献35

  • 1刘卫华.销售人员,怎样用销售薪酬来激励[J].销售与管理,2007(9):111-114. 被引量:1
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