摘要
寿险转保已成为保险市场上一种普遍的现象,由于信息和专业知识的缺乏,保单持有人进行寿险转保交易必须通过保险代理人,而保险代理人和保单持有人的行为目的不一致,导致诱导转保时有发生。本文通过建立委托代理模型分析后发现目前的代理人佣金支付制度鼓励代理人诱导转保,而引入奖惩机制则能对代理人形成激励,本文运用比较静态分析方法,考察不同制度设计对代理人行为的影响,提出了初步的制度设计构想,从而为监管机构出台相应的政策法规提供思路。
Life insurance replacement is common in the insurance market. With limited information and professional knowledge,policyholders have to conduct insurance replacement through agents. However,insurance inducement occurs in some cases due to the objective inconsistency between policyholders and agents. Based on principal-agent models,this article finds that inducement is caused by the present commission system and that rewards-and-punishment system will motivate the agents. With comparative static analysis results,the article explores impacts of different systems on agents' behaviors,and then proposes the primary system design for policy-making reference.
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期28-35,共8页
Modern Economic Science
基金
广东外语外贸大学金融学科研创新团队基金(GW2006-TA-002)资助
关键词
寿险转保
诱导转保
比较静态分析
佣金制度
Life insurance replacement
Inducement
Comparative static analysis
Commission system
