摘要
在国有企业改制过程以及相关的争论中,是否在国有制下不触及产权改革,而依靠引入像相对业绩比较这些技术手段实现国有制的效率,以往的产权理论尚未回答这类问题。本文论证了在纯国有制或者说集中所有权下,国家调控政策的巨大影响以及国家所有者和政策调控者身份的重合,加上国家无法准确把握政策的影响度,会造成这种判断信息的失真。这也说明,相对业绩比较无法取代产权改革,只能在国有经济比重不高的情况下才能起作用。
Can state ownership without property rights reform that is introduced with technical means such as relative performance comparison achieve efficiency? This issue has not been answered in the literature. This article holds that the judgment information may be misled by state macro policies,the duo roles of the state as policy maker and owner,and the difficulty to measure policy impact. This demonstrates that property rights reform cannot be replaced by relative performance comparison,which may have a role with cases where state proportion is not heavy.
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期36-43,共8页
Modern Economic Science
关键词
国有经济
产权改革
标尺竞争
充分统计量
State ownership
Property rights reform
Yardstick competition