美国公司治理:公司控制权转移的历史分析

American Corporate Governance :A Historical Analysis Focused on the Struggle for the Right of Control

本文回顾了美国公司治理体制的形成与演变历程。文中指出,伴随美国公司治理体制的不断演变,公司控制权已经从所有者手中转移到了内部的经营者和外部的监控者手中。最初,经营者和监控者都是以增进或保护所有者权益为初衷来介入公司事务的,但经过数十年的演化后,二者一道从股东手中攫取了大部分的公司控制权,实现了对公司的联合控制。20世纪七八十年代,代理理论以及以其为理论背景的股东价值论的兴起,是美国公司治理晚近的一个主要进展,但在这个时期里,股东对公司的控制权日渐式微的基本态势,没有得到实质性的改观。本文讨论了美国公司治理体制的世界性影响,并指出它不是一种理想的公司制度。

This paper focused on the formation and evolution process of American corporate governance system. This paper points out, during the past century, the shareholders＇ right of control has been breaking up. With the ongoing transformation of the corporate governance system, the right of control in most major corporations, has passed from the owners to the managers inside and the supervisors outside the corporation. In the past thirty years, the theory of the shareholder value, has been the core spirit of American corporate governance system, while the agency theory prevailing since the late of 1970s provided the necessary theoretical foundation. However, the basic pattern and trend of the decline of the shareholders＇ right remain unchanged. A model named ＂The Iron Triangle＂ was developed to show why the American corporate governance system is in trouble and how it resulted in a loss of balance.