政府干预对市场声誉机制的挤出效应——中国医疗保障制度改革的逻辑

The Crowding-out Effect of the Government Intervention in the Market Reputation Mechanism: the Logic of China's Medical Insurance System’s Reform

监管和自律是克服医生道德风险的两种主要途径,但是政府对医疗领域的过度干预会挤占市场声誉机制的发育空间,同时也进一步强化了医生的道德风险。改革现行"管办不分"的医疗卫生体制以及医院等级评定和医生职称评定制度,同时放松政府对医疗服务价格的控制,以恢复被扭曲的医疗供方市场声誉机制。

The two main ways for doctors to overcome moral hazards are supervision and self-discipline. However, the excessive intervention by the government in the medical domain may hold back the growth of the market reputation mechanism and even enhance the doctor＇s moral hazard. It is believed that the ways to restore the already distorted market reputation mechanism of medical suppliers are to reform the medical and health system featuring non-separation of regulation from operation, the hospital rating system and the doctor＇ s job appraisal system, and to relax the control by the government over the pricing of medical services.