证券市场违法违规惩戒制度的有效性研究被引量：5

The Study of Regulation Effective of Illegal Behaviors on Securities Market

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摘要应用犯罪与处罚经济学理论,分析了惩处制度中惩处率与惩处严厉度对证券市场违法违规行为的影响机理,进而区分出有效与无效的惩戒制度。在此基础上,通过两个模型的构建,以2007年深圳A股市场的上市公司为样本,从惩处率与惩处严厉程度两个维度对我国证券市场惩戒制度有效性进行了实证检验。惩戒行为与市场违法行为不存在负相关的结果表明:目前我国证券市场惩处制度的有效性较差,还有待进一步完善。 Using the crime and punishment theory, the article explains the influence mechanism on the illegal activities by the regulation institution, and differentiates the effective and ineffective institution. Based the analysis above, the paper constructs two models and tests the link between illegal behaviors and regulation for 475 listed companies in the Shenzhen A - share stock market. The results show that the illegal behaviors of listed stock is not negatively to the punishment system, which means the punishment institution in stock market of China is ineffective.

作者朱崇实汪慧

机构地区厦门大学法学院厦门大学经济学院

出处《财经理论与实践》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第4期120-124,共5页 The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

关键词违法违规制度监管有效性 Illegal Behaviors Institution Regulation Effect

分类号 D922.287 [政治法律—经济法学]

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参考文献8

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