投资者偏好与基金家族资源配置策略

Research on Investors' Prejudice & Allocation of Mutual Funds Families' Resources

本文通过构建一个基于多维任务的两层次委托代理模型,研究基金家族内部的资源配置策略与利益输送问题。分析表明,为迎合外部投资者的偏好,基金公司管理者不仅会扭曲自身的精力配置,而且会利用自身的权威扭曲家族内基金经理的精力配置以进行利益输送。

This paper studies the internai resource allocation strategy and tunneling question in mutual fund families by constructing a two- tied principal- agency model based on a multi- tasking. The analysis demonstrates that the governor in the mutual fund company not only has the incentive to distort his energy allocation, but also the energy allocation of the mutual fund manager in order to cater for the outside investors＇ prejudice.