技术许可条件下被许可企业自主创新投资决策研究——基于异质产品Cournot双寡头垄断市场的分析

Independent Innovation Investment Decisions of the Licensee Under Technology Licensing——Based on Cournot Duopoly Analysis of Heterogenous Products

为使企业能够处理好技术许可和自主创新的关系,依据线性反需求函数、技术交易成本为零和渐进性创新的假设前提,在事前技术许可条件下,建立包含事后许可的R&D竞争模型,研究事前被许可企业的自主创新投资决策及其价值,以及R&D竞争对消费者剩余和净社会福利产生的影响.研究结果表明产品差异越小,事前被许可企业对自主创新的均衡投资就越少,同时其自主创新为自身带来的均衡期望价值也越少,但这一影响在不断减弱.此外,产品差异越小,事前许可条件下R&D竞争带来的均衡消费者剩余就越少,且这一影响在不断增强.产品差异越小,事前许可条件下R&D竞争带来的均衡净社会福利就越少,但这一影响在不断减弱.因此,促使事前被许可企业增加对自主创新投入的有效途径之一是尽量增强产品的异质性.这进一步增强商业创新的重要性.

In order to make firms deal with relationship between technology licensing and independent innovation, a R＆D competion model including ex post licensing is built under ex ante licensing condition. The underlying assumptions include linear inverse market demand function, zero cost of technology transfer and incremental innovation. The model is used to study independent innovation investment decisions of the ex ante licensee and their value, as well as the impact of R＆D race on consumers＇ surplus and net social welfare. The results show that the smaller the level of product differentiation, the fewer both equilibrium investments of the ex ante licensee on independent innovation and equilibrium expected net social welfare resulted from R＆D competition, and the relationships become weaker. Otherwise, the smaller the level of product differentiation, the fewer equilibrium expected consumers＇ surplus resulted from R＆D competition, and the relationship becomes stronger. An effective way to increase R＆D investments of the ex ante licensee is to increase the level of product differentiation as much as possible. This further increases importance of business innovation.