商业信用合同的履行概率，其外部性及现金需求--中国案例

Enforceability of Trade Credit Contracts,its Externality and Cash Demand:A Case of China

本文测算了商业信用合同违约风险对商业贸易和现金需求的影响。结果显示,外国直接投资企业为其贸易伙伴提供了大量商业信用,而中国的企业,无论是私营,还是国有企业,他们交易实行货到即时付款的比例很高。外国直接投资企业之所以是经济交易中信贷的提供者,是因为他们具有较高的商业信用"合同执行技术(contract enforcement technology)"。我们还发现商业信用合同的执行技术主要包括贸易物品的竞争力、竞争幅度、与地方政府的关系以及公司治理的性质。一个企业具有较高的合同执行概率,就可能提供大量的商业信用,并获得更大的交易量。合同执行技术对贸易交易量的弹性估计约为2.2。模拟显示如果合同执行概率提高,分布在75%,贸易交易量可增加24%,商业信用规模可增加30%。由于商业信用合约的不完备而导致的经济损失则是巨大的。此外,我们证实,高的商业信用合同执行技术通过商业信用量和交易量的增加而在经济中产生正外部效应。

This paper measured the impact on default risk of trade credit contracts over the economic transaction and cash demand. The results showed that foreign direct investment （FDI） firms extended larger trade credits to their trading partner, whereas there were high ratios of cash on delivery in transactions among Chinese firms, both privately and publicly owned firms. FDI firms are the providers of credit in the economy as they have high- er ＂enforcement technology＂ of trade credits. We also found that the enforcement technology of trade credit con- tracts is mainly comprised of the competitiveness of traded goods, the function of local government players, and the nature of corporate governance. A firm with a higher enforcement probability would provide a larger trade credit and enjoy larger transaction volumes. Elasticity of ＂enforcement technology＂ to economic transaction vol- ume was estimated to be approximately 2.2. Simulations showed that if the enforcement probability was raised so that it was distributed uniformly at 75%, the volume of economic transactions would increase by 24% and the size of trade credits would increase by 30%. Economic losses due to the incompleteness of the trade credit contract were proved to be significant. Furthermore, we confirmed that high trade credit contract enforcement technology had a positive external effect through increasing trade credit and transaction volumes in the economy.