可转债融资与机构投资者侵占行为——基于华菱管线可转债案例研究

Convertible Bonds Financing and Tunneling Behavior of Institutional Investors:A Case Study of HuaLing GuanXian

本文基于投票权与现金流量权分离的理论框架,通过案例分析考察了湖南华菱管线股份有限公司可转债融资中机构投资者基于股价操纵的套利侵占行为及其在股权分置改革方案投票过程中与大股东的合谋行为,揭示了机构投资者的套利侵占行为是导致可转债发行后股价大幅下跌的主要原因。研究发现,在大股东丧失对公司绝对控制权的条件下,一方面,可转债发行后机构投资者通过负向股价操纵行为,迫使公司执行高价回售条款,实现套利侵占;另一方面,在股权分置改革方案投票过程中,机构投资者通过将其持有的可转债转股,控制股改投票权,诱使大股东合谋,侵占股东利益。结论表明,强化价格操纵行为的监管及可转债契约的合理设计是防范可转债发行中的侵占行为的关键。

This paper,in the framework of the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights,investigates the price manipulation tunneling behavior of institutional investors involved in the case of Hunan HuaLing GuanXian Corporation's issurance of convertible bonds,a form of financial innovation with extensive applica-tions in corporate financing activities.Our results provide a pioneering alternative for explaining the adverse af-fect of convertible bonds issurance on stock price in the spirit of arbitrage-based tunneling behavior.The find-ings also reveal that,under the conditions that large shareholders have no absolute controlling power,institution-al investors can expropriate large shareholders through two ways:arbitrage activities based on negative price ma-nipulation and strategic voting for proposals of share-trading reform based on collusion activities.Systematic su-pervision of manipulation activities and scientific design of convertible bonds contract are suggested to be em-ployed as two critical methods avoiding similar tunneling behaviors.