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股权集中度的适宜性与股权分置改革的对价

The Moderate Degree of the Ownership Concentration and Consideration in Share Reform——The Empirical Study on Alignment Effect and Entrenchment Effect
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摘要 本文在考察股权集中度与公司绩效之间区间效应的基础上,检验了股改前股权集中度的适宜程度在股改对价确定中的作用。研究结果发现,股权集中度越是有利于公司绩效的提升,流通股股东获送的对价水平就越低。进一步分析后发现,第一大股东持股的趋同效应越强或壕沟效应越弱,流通股股东获送的对价水平就越低。这表明适宜的股权集中度能产生"公司治理溢价",同时也说明流通股股东至少能在一定程度上识别大股东支持和掏空公司的潜在可能。 This paper examines the interval effect of the ownership concentration and corporate performance. Then it verifies the role of the moderate level of the ownership concentration in the determination of the consideration in share reform through the sample of 1025 companies that have already finished share reform before April 1, 2008. The result shows that liquidating shareholders would have lower consideration level in share reform if the ownership concentration could be more favorable for the improvement of corporate performance. The further analysis suggests that the stronger alignment effect or weaker entrenchment effect of the largest shareholding, the lower consideration level would be. This indicates that the moderate ownership concentration will result in "governance premium" and the liquidating shareholders can in some degree identify the possibilities of large shareholders' support and tunneling.
作者 姚明安 孔莹
机构地区 汕头大学商学院
出处 《南方经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第8期39-48,共10页 South China Journal of Economics
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目(08JA630047) 广东省哲学社会科学"十一五"规划项目(07G009)的资助
关键词 股权集中度 股改对价 趋同效应 壕沟效应 Ownership Concentration Consideration in Share Reform Alignment effect Entrenchment effect
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参考文献19

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