研究型大学、教师行为与科研激励合同:基于委托代理关系的分析

Research University,Teacher’s Behavior and Incentive Mechanism——an Analysis Based on Principal Agent Theory

作为研究型大学的主体，教师的行为受到科研激励机制的影响。大学通过激励机制来规范教师的行为，教师则通过自身的努力获取收益和规避风险。文章基于大学和教师之间的委托代理关系，在不对称信息条件下探讨大学和教师应如何订立科研激励合同。结果表明：当不考虑监控成本时，在最优显性激励合同中加入外控变量可以使得风险成本和激励成本下降，从而降低代理成本。在大学和教师的长期合作中，则必须充分发挥隐性激励合同的作用。

As the subject of research university, teacher＇s behavior is influenced by incentive mechanism of research. University regulates the teacher＇s behavior by the mechanism, and teacher gains revenue and evades risk by his actions. Based on Principal-agent theory, this paper discusses how to design a research incentive contract between university and teacher when information is asymmetric. The results showed that the principle cost decreases if the outer control variable is included in the optimal incentive contract （explicit contract）. The implicit contract should play a big role in the long cooperation.