基于系统动力学的环境污染演化博弈问题研究

System Dynamics Model for a Mixed-strategy Game of Environmental Pollution

用系统动力学建立环境污染管理问题中政府管理部门与生产排污企业之间的一个混合战略演化博弈模型。仿真结果表明:非对称结构的2*2混合策略演化博弈模型不存在演化均衡。从监管部门的角度出发,改变博弈支付矩阵在演化博弈过程始终保持不变的情况,在博弈支付矩阵中考虑动态惩罚策略。结果表明,本策略的演化博弈模型存在演化稳定均衡,即Nash均衡。系统动力学为演化博弈理论的验证和应用提供一个政策仿真实验平台。

A system dynamic （SD） model was built for studying a mixed-strategy evolutionary game between the governments who manage environment pollution and the enterprise who produce with contamination generates. The stability analysis and SD simulation result show that evolutionary equilibrium doesn＇t exist. A dynamic penalty was suggested in SD model for the equilibrium stabilization and the improvement in environmental pollution. Finally, the stability analysis of the evolutionary game with dynamic penalty proves that Nash equilibrium is the evolutionary equilibrium. SD provides a simulation and experiment platform for the evolutionary game theory＇s development and application.