国有资产拍卖研究综述与分析被引量：1

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摘要本文从理论上考察了国有资产的拍卖问题。我们认为在国有资产的拍卖中,西方传统的拍卖理论并不符合我国的实际情况,它的私有产权的理论前提并不成立。本文在传统拍卖理论的基础上,通过在拍卖的卖方侧引入委托代理关系,构建了一个双层委托代理的拍卖分析框架。仅就国有资产的拍卖而言,我们认为双层委托代理的拍卖分析框架比之传统的拍卖理论更具有洞察力。

作者张家贞杨斌

机构地区西安交通大学经济与金融学院

出处《经济学动态》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第8期89-92,共4页 Economic Perspectives

关键词拍卖双层委托代理国有资产

分类号 F123.7 [经济管理—世界经济]

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参考文献11

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二级参考文献8

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