有进入威胁时耐用品行业企业策略的博弈分析

Game Theory Analysis of Business Strategies in the Industry of Durable Goods under the Threat of Entry

研究存在市场进入的可能时耐用品行业在位者和进入者的销售、定价、产品创新和市场进入策略,模型为基于古诺竞争的两阶段博弈。与伯川德竞争方式相比,主要的新结论有:在位者不创新并容纳进入的结局中,进入者会实行交叉升级政策,价格歧视可以实现;在位者进行产品创新并容纳进入的结局是可能发生的;如果在位者容纳市场进入,它就不会在第一阶段过量销售老产品;容纳进入时在位者的利润并非一定小于遏制进入时的利润;当存在遏制进入的可能时,在位者也可能会选择容纳进入;在参数的不同取值范围中分析得出了企业的均衡产品创新策略和市场进入策略。

This paper analyzes strategies of sales, pricing, product innovation and market entry of an incumbent and an entrant in the industry of durable goods when there are possibilities of market entry based on a two-period game model of Cournot competition between new products. Compared with the model based on Bertrand competition, the major new findings are： when the outcome is incumbent not innovating and accommodating entry, entrant may implement cross-upgrade policy and price discrimination; The outcome of incumbent innovating and accommodating entry may occur; If the incumbent accommodates entry, it will not sell too many old products in the first period; When accommodating entry, the profit of incumbent may be higher than its profits when deterring entry; Even if it can deter entry, the incumbent may choose to accommodate entry ; By analyzing, firms＇ equilibrium strategies of product innovation and market entry have been found in different value-taking ranges of parameters.