经营风险、晋升激励与公司绩效

Operating Risk, Promotion Incentive and Corporate Performance

本文以2004—2006年中国A股上市公司为样本,检验经营风险是否以及如何影响公司高管晋升的激励效应。我们发现:①经营风险越高,公司高管晋升的激励效应越明显;②与民营公司相比,国有公司经营风险对其高管晋升激励效应的影响更小;③与政府间接控制的国有公司相比,政府直接控制的国有公司的经营风险对其高管晋升激励效应的影响更小。本文检验结果支持当业绩度量噪音较大时晋升激励更为有效的理论推断,并表明政府对国有公司的薪酬管制会限制其对激励合约的选择,而监督的加强有助于弥补激励合约的不足。

The paper uses listed companies with A-share in China as sample and examines whether and how operating risk affects the efficiency of corporate executive promotion incentive. We find that： （1）the efficiency of executive promotion incentive is positively correlated with operating risk; （2）the correlation for SOEs is weaker than that for private companies; （3）the correlation for SOEs controlled directly by government is weaker than that for those controlled indirectly. The results support the theory that promotion incentive is more efficient when the noise in performance measurement is large and suggest that compensation regulation on SOEs will restrict the choice of incentive contracts, and the strengthening monitoring can make up for the inefficiency of incentive contract.