转型期的政治激励、财政分权与地方官员经济行为

On the Development Behavior of Local Officials in China:An Analysis based on Political Incentive and Federalism

本文在一个框架内考虑了政治激励与财政分权,考察了转型期我国地方官员的经济行为。中央强调经济增长与财政收入增加的考核导向,使得地方财政支出过度偏向基础设施建设而公共品支出不足,同时抑制了其中的官员私人消费支出。在资本不可流动但多期情形下,地方官员通过降低税率和加大基础设施投资来积累资本。在资本可流动情形下,地方官员为了吸引资本,有额外的激励降低征税力度和加大基础设施建设投入。在资本可流动情形下,地区初始发展水平差距意味着地区吸引资本能力的差异,这可能导致地区发展差距比资本不可流动情形下更大。由于资本有更好的流动性,地方倾向于将财政压力施加到劳动所得上,从而导致初次收入分配中劳动所得份额偏低。

In an integrated framework considering both political incentive and fiscal decentralization,the paper studies local officials＇ economic behaviors during transition period. The Emphasis of economy and fiscal income growth by central government, lead local fiscal structure bias to too much infrastructure development but too little public expenditure,repress officials＇ private expenditure. In multi-period and capital immobility situation,local officials cut tax rate and increase infrastructure expenditure to accumulate capital. In capital mobility situation,to attract capital inflow ,officials have extra incentive to cut tax rate and increase infrastructure expenditure. However,in capital mobility situation,the initial development gap may leads to even more uneven development. Due to capital＇s ease of mobility,local governments prefer to tax on labor income ,leading to a bias in income distribution.