销售绩效的博弈分析与激励契约

Gambling Analysis and Incentive Contract of Sales Performance

企业销售人员基于自身利益的驱动会产生道德风险行为,道德风险严重地阻碍了企业的发展。运用不完全信息动态博弈理论和委托-代理理论,建立了防范道德风险的博弈模型,定量地讨论了均衡状态下的最优博弈策略,并给出了基于最优博弈策略促使销售人员努力完成销售任务的激励契约。

In corporation, salesman would have the moral hazard behavior in view of his own benefit, and the moral hazard behavior has hindered the development of corporation seriously. Using incomplete information dynamic gamble theory and principal-agent theory, this paper has founded the gambling model which guard against moral hazard, and has discussed optimal gambling strategy under the equilibrium state quantitatively. At last, the incentive contract based on optimal gambling strategy, which urges salesman to finish sales task diligently, is given.