员工效率工资与企业的管理效率分析

Labor Efficiency, Wages and Corporate Management Efficiency Analysis

本文在文献回顾基础上分析了效率工资的Solow模型和Shapiro-stiglitz模型存在的局限性,认为由于工资合约具有非完备性特点,通过工资合约对员工进行完全激励是困难的;之后基于重复博弈理论构建了同时考虑内外部劳动力市场要求的效率工资模型,运用博弈理论分析了企业和员工在效率工资博弈过程中的行为和策略,揭示了该模型较之均衡效率工资模型具有的更为丰富的经济内涵,从八个方面阐述了效率工资对企业提高管理效率的价值,认为效率工资需要与其它激励机制相互补充,建立全面报酬体系才能实现其激励的目的。

In a market economy, wages are determined by labors＇ productivity and efficiency. New-classical economic theory argues that the allocation of labor is realized through competition in the external labor market. However, a large number of empirical studies show that, to a great extent, labor resources are allocated through the internal labor market. This article intends to study the efficiency-wage model and to overcome its limitations by combining it with internal market theory and game theory to establish a new model. This new model will fulfill the requirement of dealing with demand in both internal and external labor markets, and explain the mechanism of interaction among wage incentives, monitoring incentives, labor efficiency and corporation management. Instead of adopting the theory of perfect information, market clearing and the homogeneity of labor, this paper applies the basic analytical framework to develop a new efficiency-wage model based on the new interaction mechanism. The implications of this new model are discussed. In addition, through systematical analysis, the limitations of the Solow Model and the Shapiro-Stiglitz Model are identified. It is difficult to bring about labor diligence simply by using a wage contract, for this has the characteristics of incompleteness. To solve the wage efficiency problem in the existing model, this paper puts forth an efficiency-wages model based on game theory. The advantage of the new model is that it has more economic applications than the equilibrium efficiency-wages model. Using the game theory model, this article analyzes examples of game playing behavior and strategy in the relationship between employers and labor. The results show that the efficiency-wages model can improve eight aspects of corporate management efficiency compared to existing models. The efficiency-wages model should complement other mechanisms in setting up total reward strategies, and thus help attain the corporate goal of increasing effort on the part of workers.