企业特许经营中受许者的搭便车行为及其监督机制

The Franchisees' Free-Riding Behaviors and Its Monitoring System in Franchising

针对1个特许者和2个位于同一市场中的受许者构成的特许经营体系,分析受许者的搭便车行为与特许者的监督问题。当特许者不进行监督时,如果2个受许者提供的服务质量水平具有较大的正外部性,则当受许者提供服务质量的成本较大时,受许者将存在搭便车行为,从而导致双方都不提供服务质量。但当受许者提供服务质量的成本不是很大时,特许者可以通过对受许者的搭便车行为进行监督而有效阻止受许者的搭便车行为,从而提高整个特许经营体系的效率。

Aiming at the franchising system which consists of one franchisor and two franchisees in the same market, analyses the franchisees＇ free-riding behaviors and the franchisor＇s monitoring problems. When the franchisor doesn＇t monitor, the service quality provided by the two franchisees has a higher positive externality and the cost of the service quality is big enough, the franchisees＇ free-riding behaviors will occur which will lead to neither of them providing high quality of service. If the cost is not big, the franchisor can effectively prevent free-riding behaviors by monitoring the franchisees＇ behaviors .Thus improves the efficiency of entire franchising system.