基于博弈分析的企业质量信用研究

Study on Enterprise Quality Credit by Using Game Theory

通过分析市场经济条件下信息不对称的影响以及"劣币驱逐良币"现象产生的原因,分别建立企业间以及企业与政府间的质量信用博弈模型,在此分析基础上得出重复博弈对企业质量信用机制建设的重要作用。通过企业质量信用分类监管实施试点工作的实证研究,进一步得出政府作为市场监管者,实施分类监管措施是建立有效企业质量信用机制的不二途径。

Because of information asymmetry, in overcome this, two game models of quality credit some times, the bad outdoes the good in marketing. To are built to describe the quality credit relation between enterprises and between governments and enterprises. Based on the models, case studies are done in realworld enterprise quality credit environment. It is shown that government supervision is the only effective mechanism to build product quality credit systems.