摘要
应用博弈理论,研究由单一制造商和单一零售商构成的闭环供应链系统中各成员的定价策略,分析在制造商为领导者,但零售商具有私人回收成本的情况下零售商的谎报行为,给出了信息不对称情况下双方的定价策略,将其与对称信息下的相应定价策略进行了比较,分析了零售商的谎报行为对闭环供应链各成员利润的影响。
Considering asymmetric information, the pricing game between manufacturer and retailer is analyzed by using game theory. Then, a pricing strategy is proposed for closed-loop supply chain that is composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. By using this model, the effect of retailer＇ s misreporting on the profit of various parts on the supply chain is presented by comparison with situation under symmetric information environment.
出处
《工业工程》
北大核心
2009年第3期39-42,共4页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871125)
重庆市自然科学基金资助项目(2006BB0188)
关键词
闭环供应链
博弈
信息不对称
定价
谎报
closed-loop supply chain
game theory
asymmetric information
pricing
misreporting
