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一个具有变化联盟结构的动态合作博弈模型 被引量:2

A Dynamic Cooperative Game with Changing Coalition Partitions
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摘要 本文运用合作博弈的观点分析和解决在动态决策进程中出现的合作方式发生变化的问题。针对于在博弈树给定的有限个节点上随机改变联盟剖分的动态博弈,通过引入新的特征函数和最优准则,建立了动态最优解PGN向量,同时给出了求最优路径和最优解的算法。 This paper employs cooperative game theory to analyze and solve the problem of possible changes of coalition structure in dynamic decision process. For dynamic games that randomly change coalition partitions at limited fixed nodes of the game tree, the dynamic optimal solutions (PGN vector) and the algorithm for constructing the optimal sub-tree are given by introducing new defined character functions and optimal rules.
作者 乔晗 高红伟
出处 《运筹与管理》 CSCD 北大核心 2009年第4期60-66,共7页 Operations Research and Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571040 70711120204 70871064) 山东省研究生教育创新计划基金资助项目(SDYC08045)
关键词 运筹学 PGN向量 联盟剖分 动态合作博弈 operational research PCN-vector coalitional partition dynamic cooperative game
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参考文献8

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