基于期权博弈的跨国并购实证分析——以联想并购IBMPC为例

Real Option-game: Empirical Analysis in Cross-border M&A

将实物期权定价方法引入到讨价还价谈判博弈中,分别建立了完全信息和不完全信息跨国并购期权博弈模型,并应用纳什讨价还价定理求出了其中不完全信息博弈的唯一解,以及完全信息博弈的解区间。该模型证明期权估值法具有普遍意义,DCF估值法是跨国并购中的一种特例,最后,通过联想并购IBMPC案例检验了模型的基本结论。

Under the pricing model of real options, set asymmetric and symmetric information Nash bargaining option-games. Fines out the only solution of the asymmetric game and the solution range of the symmetric game. The conclusion is that the DCF pficing model fits only one situation and the pricing model of real options fits cross-border M＆A. In the end, tests the model by the M＆A ease between Lenovo and IBM PC.