企业高管薪酬规制理论研究:动因、实践与启示被引量：9

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摘要现实生活中,企业高管薪酬实践受到来自政府及相关机构税收、会计和信息披露等方面政策的制约和影响。由本次国际金融危机引发的全球"限薪"浪潮,使得企业高管薪酬治理带有越来越浓厚的政府规制色彩。本文主要对企业高管薪酬规制的动因、全球实践和主要效应进行了深入的理论分析,进而对如何提升政府薪酬规制效率这个问题进行了思考。

作者黄再胜

机构地区上海财经大学国际工商管理学院南京政治学院上海分院

出处《外国经济与管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第8期19-27,共9页 Foreign Economics & Management

基金中国博士后基金第43批面上资助项目<企业员工战略共享的激励机理模式与应用研究>(编号:20080430647)

关键词企业高管薪酬规制动因实践启示

分类号 F270 [经济管理—企业管理]

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参考文献17

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