康熙朝的督抚与地方钱粮亏空

Governors and Local Tax Deficits in the Kangxi Reign

清康熙朝中后期,地方钱粮亏空成蔓延上升的态势,考诸亏空原因,它与地方财政、仓政,以及吏政都有着密切的关系,由于地方没有"存留公项"的自主财政,仓储规则也缺乏适时的监管机制,这些都为不法官吏婪赃提供了方便。对此,督抚在被寄予直省守土之责的同时,对钱粮的监管与查处也有不可推卸的责任。然个人的廉洁与才干并不能杜绝亏空的发生,因失察、徇庇、挪用等涉案钱粮亏空受惩的督抚不乏其人。所以,在制度缺陷已然亏空之源头的情况下,钱粮亏空在康熙朝成不可遏制之势。

Local tax deficits were increasingly widespread during the middle and late Kangxi reign. An investigation of the various reasons for these deficits reveals that they were closely related to local finance, treasury regulations and offcial discipline. Owing to the lack of regulations governing retention and storage of taxes and the absence of timely supervision, dishonest officials had convenient opportunities for embezzlement. Governors, being responsible for supervision of the provinces, were directly to blame for not monitoring tax collection and for not investigating and not punishing malpractices. Individual integrity and talent could not prevent deficits, and there were many governors who were punished for their own misappropriations as well as for failing to impeach or for sheltering the offenders. Thus, given that existing institutional defects were the source of these deficits, it it was impossible to limit the tax deficits in the Kangxi reign.