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宽大政策瓦解卡特尔的最优机制研究

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摘要 有效的反价格合谋政策应该能够改变企业参与合谋的激励。宽大政策通过增加卡特尔企业的背叛激励、降低卡特尔惩罚的严厉性和增加卡特尔企业之间的不信任,来成功的瓦解卡特尔。最优的宽大政策设计要发挥威慑效应应该确定最优的罚金额度,并根据反垄断机关的执法能力和执法效能来灵活设计,以保证宽大政策的执法有效性。
出处 《经济评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第5期117-122,共6页 Economic Review
基金 国家社会科学基金项目“反价格合谋的激励性执法政策研究”(08BJY095) 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“维持转售价格问题研究”(07JJD630017)资助
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