摘要
考虑存在2个上游厂商和N个下游厂商组成的2层市场结构,研究了当上、下游厂商组成的纵向RJV只进行1次和无限次R&D合作时的稳定性条件。讨论了社会整体福利最优条件下纵向RJV的规模选择,分析了在R&D活动中起主导作用的上游厂商选择不同R&D形式的成本约束,以及政府为实现社会整体福利最优对厂商R&D活动进行成本补贴的条件。结果表明:合理的违约惩罚机制可以保证上游厂商遵守RJV协议;当贴现因子高于一定程度,无限次R&D合作的纵向RJV具有稳定性;如果R&D活动能够改善社会整体福利,政府应该通过补贴R&D投入的方式激励厂商更多从事R&D投资,实现社会整体福利最优。
Considering a two-tier market structure that consists of two upstream firms and some downstream oligopolists,this paper analyzes the stability condition of vertical research joint ventures under circumstances of a one time R＆D cooperation or an infinitely repeated R＆D cooperation, discusses the relationship of RJV size and the social optimum, and analyzes the cost constraint of upstream firms dominant in R＆D choice and the condition of government subsiding R＆D expenditures of the firms to realize the social optimum. This study shows that effective punishment mechanism can make upstream firm abide by RJV contract. If the discount factor is high enough, infinitely repeated RJV has the stability. In order to realize the social optimum, government may take some measures on subsiding R＆D expenditures of the firms to encourage them to do more R＆D activities when the social welfare can be improved by R＆D process.
出处
《系统管理学报》
北大核心
2009年第4期421-427,共7页
Journal of Systems & Management
基金
国家‘985’二期工程哲学社会科学创新基地--上海交通大学中国都市圈发展与管理研究中心(RCM-RC)资助项目
