摘要
随着经济全球化的发展,战略性贸易政策的实施必须考虑到资本结构方面的因素。在Spencer和Brander研究的基础上引入资本结构变量,并构建一个三阶段的博弈模型对战略性R&D补贴政策的效果进行分析。分析结果表明,考虑资本结构后,战略性R&D补贴的效果将大为削弱,当外资所占比例较高时,战略性R&D补贴政策不一定是出口国的最优贸易战略,理论上应该选择对R&D活动征税的政策。针对战略性R&D补贴政策在我国的运用情况,就如何更好地发挥这一政策的效果提出了相应的政策建议。
With the development of economic globalization, capital structure should be taken into account when implement the strategic trade policy. Based on the research foundation of Spencer and Brander, this paper adds in a variable named capital structure and constructs a three-stage game model to analyze the effect of strategic R＆D subsidy policy. The result shows that the effect of strategic R＆D subsidy policy will be weakened a lot when considering the capital structure. And if the foreign capital takes up a relatively large proportion, strategic R＆D subsidy policy will not the optimal trade policy for the exporting country, and theoretically the government should choose to impose tax on the R＆D activity. According to the practical condition of the strategic R＆D policy carried out in China, the paper also puts forward some proposals on how to better bring the policy into play.
出处
《科学学与科学技术管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第9期10-15,共6页
Science of Science and Management of S.& T.
基金
教育部人文社科基金一般项目"基于企业吸收能力与公共研发政策互补关系的技术创新支持体系研究"(07JA790042)
