关于我国央行独立性与通货膨胀的研究

The Study on Central Bank Independence and Inflation in China

货币政策的最终目标与央行独立性存在密切联系,本文借助SVAR方法,分析和比较了我国央行1984～2007年以来通货膨胀厌恶程度,说明了中国人民银行从1984年正式成立到现在独立性逐步扩大。我国央行通货膨胀厌恶程度和经济牺牲率的历史演化趋势,有助于公众形成关于央行货币政策的心理预期,从而降低央行反通货膨胀的成本,有助于央行通过宣言的方式来影响企业和公众的决策与行动,也有助于公众和企业根据央行货币政策的动向提前做出有效的决策。

There are very closely correlations between central bank independence and the objective of monetary policy. Using a structural VAR approach, this paper provides an overview of accumulated empirical evidence on the relation between central bank independence and the objective of monetary policy in China. The paper analyses the extent of inflation aversion for the people＇s bank of China from 1984 to 2007. We find that the people＇s bank of China becomes more and more independent. At the same time, we also study the development trends of inflation aversion about the people＇s bank of China and the sacrifice ratio owing to disinflation. If the independence of the people＇s bank of China has gone deep into people＇s minds, central bank can influence decisions of people or enterprises through simple policy rules. Therefore, our studies help to influence the people＇s expectation about monetary policy and reduce the cost of disinflation.