政府竞争与区域经济差异

Intergovernmental Competition and Regional Disparities

本文以中国经济为背景，借助博弈模型从理论上探讨了存在区域差异、包含两级政府的经济中的政府竞争问题。我们导入了两种不同的征税体制，综合分析了中央领导下的政府竞争、地区分权下的政府竞争和同时行动的政府竞争模式下的竞争均衡的效率性以及相应的最优征税机制设定问题，并进一步讨论了政府竞争对区域经济差异的影响。分析表明，区域政府竞争可能导致效率的损失，要实现经济的最优状态，中央政府必须设定适当的征税机制以激励地区政府在选择时兼顾对其他地区的影响，适当的财政政策设计可以使竞争兼顾效率与公平。

This paper addresses the fiscal competition in an economy that is characterized by regional disparities and two levels of government. Two different taxation mechanisms are introduced into our models, and the consequences of fiscal competition under a centralized leadership, a decentralized leadership and simultaneous moves of both levels of government are examined and compared. We conclude that regardless of the sequence of moves of the two levels of government, the economy can achieve the social optimum if the central government sets an appropriate taxation mechanism. In addition, under this taxation mechanism, the income gap between two regions vanishes at the equilibrium.