论维特根斯坦《逻辑哲学论》中的基本事态

ON Sachverhalt of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico—Philosophicus

事实表达的是现实性,事态表达的是可能性。维特根斯坦在此区分了两个系列:第一个系列是现实世界——事实——基本事实——对象的外在性,第二个系列是可能世界——事态——基本事态——对象的内在性。学界有种观点认为,基本事态对应着命题逻辑的原子命题,这种观点是错误的。从布拉德雷问题的解决来看,维特根斯坦正是基于基本事态的提出,将基本事态看成世界的逻辑原子,并遵从了布拉德雷的"内在关系说",才得以避开哲学上对本体的无穷追溯。

This paper aims to give the explanation of Sachverhalt of Wittgenstein＇s Tractatus Logieo - - - Philosophicus. Fact expresses the character of reality, and states of thing express the possibility. Wittgenstein distinguishes two series, one is a sequence ： the reality - facts - atomic facts - the external character of objects, the other There is is a sequence： the possible world - states of thing - a state of thing - the internal character of objects. a wrong opinion that a state of thing corresponds to the atomic proposition in the propositional logic. This paper will give a demonstration. Another question is the F. H. Bradley＇s problem. There are some discussions about it.