董事会独立性、管理者过度自信与资本结构决策

Boards of Directors Independence,Managerial Overconfidence and Decisions of Capital Structure

本文以我国上市公司总经理的年龄、任职时间、两职兼任情况以及工作背景作为管理者过度自信的替代变量,具体考察了管理者的过度自信行为对我国上市公司资本结构决策的影响。研究结果表明:总经理的年龄越大,任职时间越长,以及当总经理拥有技术类工作背景时,总经理的过度自信行为越弱,总经理越选择较低的负债比率;当总经理同时兼任董事长时,总经理的过度自信行为越强,总经理越选择较高的负债比率。进一步的研究发现,董事会独立性的增强可以弱化总经理的过度自信行为,因此总经理过度自信与公司负债比率之间的正相关关系有所减弱。本文的研究意义不仅在于丰富和拓展了国内外的相关研究成果,而且有助于我们从管理者的个人特征方面来理解我国上市公司的资本结构决策。

This paper selects age, tenure, whether the board chair and CEO positions are consolidated, and work background of CEOs in Chinese listed companies as proxy measures of managerial overconfidence, and examines the effect of managerial overconfidence on capital structure decisions. The empirical results show that, when CEOs are older and have longer tenure, when the board chair and CEO positions are separated, and when CEOs have technical work background, CEOs have weaker managerial overconfidence, then they choose lower debt ratio; What＇s more, in companies which boards of directors are more independent, the positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and debt ratio is weakened. This research not only enriches and extends the related studies on managerial overconfidence and capital structure, but also helps understand capital structure decisions in Chinese listed companies on aspect of managerial characteristics.