代理理论、审计质量与公司治理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Agent Theory,Audit Quality and Corporate Governance——Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

以我国证券市场2000年至2007年的上市公司为样本,通过考察审计质量对业绩—薪酬敏感性的影响,研究审计在解决第一类委托代理问题过程中的公司治理功能。以会计师事务所规模为审计质量代理变量的检验表明,前十大事务所的业绩—薪酬敏感性显著高于其他事务所,审计质量显著影响会计业绩在薪酬契约中的作用。这些证据表明,"十大"会计师事务所在缓解股东与高管之间的委托代理冲突中发挥了显著的公司治理功能。

The authors examine whether auditors serve the governance role by providing a bonding mechanism to mitigate manager - shareholder conflicts in emerging markets by investigating the influence of audit quality on the sensitivity of executive compensation to accounting performance. The authors execute a two- step procedure and find evidence that audit quality remains significantly related to the pay- earnings relation. Results show that the pay- earnings sensitivities of Big Ten clients are statistically significantly higher than for non- Big Ten clients. The results obtained in a switch sample of firms grouped according to shifts from and to Big Ten and non- Big Ten auditor with respect to the inclusion of other explanatory factors for pay - earnings relation that have been suggested by previous studies. Taken together, the results sing- gest that audit quality plays an important role in the use of accounting information in executive compensation contracts and that Big Ten auditors in China do have a corporate governance role by alleviating the manager- shareholder conflicts.