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美国经理报酬信息披露制度改革及对我国的启示 被引量:1

USA SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules of 2006 and Its Experience to China
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摘要 针对日益严重的上市公经理高额经理报酬问题,2006年,美国SEC颁布了新的经理报酬信息披露规制。和1992年信息披露规则一样,新规则仍然要求上市公司通过提交专门经理报酬报告的形式,并采用图表、表格等方式全面、直观地披露经理报酬信息,但在报酬信息披露内容、披露对象、披露方式等方面都作出了重大的修改。我国上市公司经理报酬问题也日渐突出,经理报酬信息披露不充分、不完全也不透明,信息的可比性差。这不利于股东经理报酬知情权的保护。美国SEC改革对于我国上市公司经理报酬信息披露制度的建设具有重要的借鉴意义。 On the basis of 1992 rules, USA SEC issued new executive compensation rules in 2006. New rules insist on requiring listed companies viatablesand graphs to disclose the executives' compensation in a comprehensive and direct way. New rules made a lot of amendments, as well including the contents, the objects and the way of disclosure, aiming to make the executives'compensation more transparent to shareholders. In China, the executive compensation problem is becoming more and more serious, and the disclosure system is far to say overall, comprehensive and transparent. It is also difficult to compare between companies. In order to protect shareholders; right to information of executive compensation of listed companies, we can make full use of the experience of USA to perfect our executive compensation disclosure rules.
作者 张怡超
出处 《河北法学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第10期157-166,共10页 Hebei Law Science
关键词 上市公司 报酬信息披露 报酬图表与表格 股东知情权 listed company executive compensation disclosure tabular & graph disclosure shareholders'right to information
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