家族企业与国有企业代理成本的比较——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

A Comparison between Agency Cost of Familial Enterprises and Agency Cost of State-owned Enterprises

以家族控股型及国有控股型上市公司2002-2004年的数据为样本,通过考察治理机制对企业代理成本的影响间接检验了家族企业与国有企业在代理成本上的差异。研究结果显示:在控制治理机制的影响下,家族控股公司的绩效要好于国有控股的公司;治理机制对家族控股及国有控股公司的绩效均有正向作用;治理机制对国有控股公司绩效的正向作用显著大于家族控股的公司。基于这些发现,得出家族企业的代理问题不如国有企业严重。

This paper takes as sample the data of familial shareholding enterprises and state-owned shareholding enterprises from 2002 to 2004. On the basis of the survey the influence of the mechanism of control on the agency cost of the enterprises, it examines the differences in the agency cost between familial enterprises and state-owned enterprises. The study shows that, after the impact of the mechanism of control, the performance of the familial shareholding enterprises is better than the state-owned shareholding enterprises. The mechanism of control is positively relevant to both familial shareholding and state-owned shareholding enterprises. The mechanism of control of the state-owned shareholding enterprises is positively more influential than the familial shareholding enterprises. On the basis of these discoveries, it can be deduced that the agency of familial enterprises is not so serious as the that of state-owned enterprises.