摘要
文章选择2005年在深、沪两市最终控制者为个人或家族的A股上市公司作为研究样本,对家族CEO和非家族CEO薪酬水平差异以及家族CEO和非家族CEO薪酬对绩效的敏感性差异作了实证分析。研究结果表明,家族CEO的货币薪酬水平与非家族CEO的货币薪酬水平并不存在显著差异,而在持股比例上家族CEO显著高于非家族CEO;家族CEO薪酬对绩效的敏感性低于非家族CEO薪酬对绩效的敏感性。
This study takes family- controlled listed companies in 2005 in A stock market for example, and examines the compensation level and sensitivity of pay to performance between family CEOs and nonfamily CEOs. The result shows that compensation levels of family CEOs are not lower than that of nonfamily CEOs ; that the compensation of family CEOs is less sensitive to performance than that of nonfamily CEOs.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
2009年第9期127-131,共5页
East China Economic Management
基金
广东金融学院(06XJ03-03)项目资助
关键词
家族企业
薪酬激励
委托代理
family firm
compensation incentive
principal - agent
