对心理主义和反心理主义之争的超越性批判——为反心理主义制做“认识断裂”论证

A Transcending Criticism to the Debate of Psychologism and Anti-pshychologism——An "Epistemological Crack" Argument for Anti-psychologist

胡塞尔的反心理主义论证缺乏对问题的精确反思和厘定,仅仅从心理事实与观念意义的存在差异出发,而没有纳入认识的不同类型这一元素,因而缺少必要的论证条件,使得论证的正确思路难以显现,并把论证在形式上拖入逻辑违法和繁琐庞杂境地,丧失了论证的真理明晰性和论断震撼力,在结果上引向过度否定心理主义的错误。实际上,反心理主义仅仅适用于关于存在对象的"构成—论证—纯粹"式研究这种拥有最高理论严格性和确实性的认识类型,在其中,必须坚持具有根据连续性的内在构成分析而排除外在关联性的自然因果观点,因而仅仅根据心理与意识的存在分离性和关联的因果性即可断定两者之间在认识上的断裂,从而可以简捷明确地拒绝意识研究中的心理主义。

Husserl＇s anti-psychologism argument lacks of exact reflection and definition to issues, and only starts from the existential difference between psychological facts and conceptual meaning, while neglects the element of the different types of epistemology, resulting in the error of over-denying psy- chologism. In fact, anti-psychologism is only suitable to the type of ＂formation-argument-purity＂ studies of the existential object, in which the consistent analysis of inner formation must be adhered to. The epistemological crack can be determined by the separation between psychology and conscious- ness and the causation of connection, thus to directly refuse the psychologism in the studies of con- sciousness.