不完善激励工资契约、团队成员流动与互助合作：职业声誉关注的角度

Imperfect Incentive Wage Contract,Team Member's Mobility and Cooperation:A Perspective of Career Concern

团队业绩导向的不完善激励工资契约和团队成员流动的综合作用对团队成员的职业声誉关注、最优激励工资契约和团队成员的互助合作的影响依赖于团队成员的风险规避程度。当团队成员的风险规避程度足够高时,团队成员的职业声誉关注效应受到激发,委托人通过提高对团队成员互助合作的显性激励强度可以有效促进团队成员的互助合作,而且团队成员的最优互助合作努力水平向上扭曲的程度随着团队成员流动的可能性提高而提高。

The synthetic effects of the imperfection of team-based incentive wage contract and team member＇s mobility on his career concern, the optimal incentive wage contract and cooperation among team members depend on team member＇s risk aversion. When team member＇s risk aversion is sufficiently high, team member＇s career concern is motivated, the principal can promote cooperation among team members effectively by providing high power explicit incentives with respect to team member＇s helping his teammate. Moreover, the upward distortion of the optimal cooperative effort is enhanced as the possibility of team member＇s mobility increases.