摘要
运用博弈论不完全信息静态博弈分析方法,对我国制造企业的产品造假行为及其监管问题进行了分析。揭示了制造企业、质监机构、政府管理部门围绕产品质量问题的行为动机及不完全信息静态博弈的均衡结果。基于博弈分析的结论,从政府管理部门、质监机构以及公众媒体的角度提出了加强我国制造企业产品质量监管的启示和建议。
Applying the method of game theory, this article analyzes the product counterfeiting acts of China's manufacturing enterprises from the perspective of incomplete information and static game. Motivations and balanced outcome of game among manufacturing enterprises,' quality supervision institutions and government management department were revealed. Some recommendations and advice on how to effectively regulate the product quality are proposed based on conclusions of theoretical analysis.
出处
《科技与管理》
CSSCI
2009年第5期106-108,共3页
Science-Technology and Management
关键词
产品质量
造假行为
博弈
质量监管
product quality
counterfeiting acts
game
quality supervision